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CONFRONTING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: 
ADDRESSING THE UNANSWERED QUESTION OF WHETHER 
AUTOPSY REPORTS ARE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
 APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
People v. Hall1 
(decided April 21, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 7, 2005, defendant Ralph Hall was convicted of 
murder in the first and second degrees.2  Defendant appealed, alleg-
ing that the State violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights 
by admitting an unredacted autopsy report conducted by a non-
testifying witness.3  According to defendant, the autopsy report was 
testimonial in nature, entitling him to the right to cross-examine the 
medical examiner who performed the autopsy.4 
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the con-
viction, holding that the testimony of an expert medical examiner at 
trial, though not the examiner who created the autopsy report, was 
non-testimonial in nature and therefore admissible as evidence.5  The 
court found that the surrogate witness, testifying to the factual por-
tions of the autopsy report, sufficiently satisfied defendant‘s right of 
confrontation.6 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether an 
 
1 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011). 
2 Id. at 433. 
3 Id. at 429.  The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: ―In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.‖  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
4 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429. 
5 Id. at 432. 
6 Id. at 432-33. 
1
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autopsy report is considered testimonial evidence for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, the New York Court of Appeals has already 
decided that autopsy report are not testimonial.
7
  This article will ana-
lyze whether the New York approach to autopsy reports is consistent 
with federal precedent regarding forensic laboratory reports.  
II. THE OPINION – PEOPLE V. HALL 
The opinion of People v. Hall reveals little about the criminal 
activities Hall engaged in; all that is divulged are the crimes for 
which Hall was convicted after a jury trial in the Supreme Court.8  Of 
the three issues raised on appeal, the salient issue was whether the 
State violated defendant‘s constitutional right to confront his accusers 
by introducing the autopsy report without the testimony of the medi-
cal examiner who performed the autopsy.9 
At trial, Dr. Lara Goldfedder, a medical examiner with the 
Office of Chief Medical Examiner (―OCME‖), testified as to the vic-
tim‘s cause of death.10  However, a former medical examiner at the 
OCME, Dr. John Lacy, had performed the autopsy instead of Dr. 
Goldfedder, but he had moved to a different state by the time of trial 
and was therefore unavailable to testify.11 
Dr. Goldfedder explained to the court how she had reviewed 
the report and several photographs from the autopsy prepared by Dr. 
Lacy.12  Her characterization of her review, along with her ―familiari-
 
7 People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that an autopsy report 
was non-testimonial and therefore admissible under the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule). 
8 In addition to the murder convictions, Hall was found guilty of first-degree attempted 
murder, first-degree attempted assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, one count of 
second-degree robbery and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees.  
Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 433.  
9 Id. at 429, 433.  In addition to the constitutional claim, defendant also appealed the trial 
court‘s determination that the police lineup was not suggestive and the trial court‘s discretion 
to exclude defendant‘s girlfriend from the courtroom violated his right to a public trial.  Id. at 
433.  The trial judge had ruled that despite the age differences between defendant and the 
other participants in the lineup, the physical appearances of all participants did not reflect 
such disparities.  Id.  The trial judge also excluded defendant‘s girlfriend from the courtroom 
on the ground that she was a potential witness.  Id.  The Appellate Division affirmed both 
determinations.  Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 433.  
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ty of the OCME‘s practices and procedures, . . . laid the foundation 
for [admitting] the report and photographs as business records.‖13  Dr. 
Goldfedder used the factual portions of the report to formulate her 
own conclusions and opinions as to what caused the victim‘s death.14  
Based on her own findings and expertise, it was Dr. Goldfedder‘s 
opinion that the victim died from a gunshot wound to the head.15  Dr. 
Goldfedder stressed throughout her testimony that she reached all of 
her conclusions independently and did not rely on any of Dr. Lacy‘s 
opinions for support.16 
On cross-examination, the defense elicited testimony from Dr. 
Goldfedder demonstrating how the condition of the victim‘s remains 
gave no indication as to the identity of the shooter.17  Furthermore, 
Dr. Goldfedder was unable to determine the number of guns that 
were used, whether the shooter was sitting or standing, or even if 
another shooter was present.18  Her testimony was strictly related to 
what happened to the victim, and she did not provide - nor could she 
provide - any factual data directly linking the defendant as the perpe-
trator of the crime.19  The Appellate Division concluded that the au-
topsy report was non-testimonial in nature and therefore did not vi-
olate defendant‘s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.20  The trial 
court‘s conviction and sentence were affirmed.21 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In 2004, the Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Crawford 
v. Washington22 held that testimonial evidence is inadmissible unless 
 
13 Id.; see Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (providing that documents kept in the ordinary course of 
business and made by a person with knowledge form an exception to the exclusionary rule of 
hearsay); see also id. advisory committee‘s notes (―A sufficient foundation for the introduc-
tion of such evidence will be laid if the party seeking to introduce the evidence is able to 
show that it was the regular practice of the activity . . . [performed by] a person with know-
ledge . . . .‖). 
14 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30. 
15 Id. at 429, 431-32. 
16 Id. at 429-30. 
17 Id. at 432. 
18 Id. 
19 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432. 
20 Id. at 432-33. 
21 Id. at 433. 
22 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3
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the prosecution can prove that the declarant is unavailable to testify 
and the defense had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that wit-
ness.23  The Court applied this holding five years later in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts24 where it held that the sworn affidavits by ab-
sent laboratory technicians were testimonial statements under the 
Confrontation Clause and entitled the defendant to confront those 
technicians.25 
Although Supreme Court precedent is binding on issues in-
volving the federal Constitution,26 the Appellate Division distin-
guished the then-most recent federal case, Melendez-Diaz, with the 
leading New York Court of Appeals cases.27  The court felt the issues 
and facts in Melendez-Diaz were not determinative of the issue pre-
sented before them and followed binding Court of Appeals cases in-
stead.28 
New York precedent has established that the admission of an 
autopsy report into evidence as a business record does not violate a 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.29  As long as the 
testifying medical examiner relies on the factual portions of the report 
 
23 Id. at 68; see Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (―[F]or testimonial evi-
dence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment ‗demands what the common law required: un-
availability [of the witness] and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.‘ ‖ (quoting Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 68)). 
24 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009) (―This case involves little more than the application of our 
holding in Crawford v. Washington.  The Sixth amendment does not permit the prosecution 
to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission of such evidence 
against Melendez-Diaz was error.‖). 
25 Id. at 2532. 
26 People v. Kin Kan, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (N.Y. 1991) (―All courts are, of course, 
bound by the United States Supreme Court‘s interpretations of Federal statutes and the Fed-
eral Constitution.‖). 
27 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31. 
28 Id. at 429-32.  The issue in Melendez-Diaz concerned the tesimoniality of certificates of 
analysis prepared by non-testifying laboratory analysts, whereas in Hall the issue was 
whether the prosecution could introduce a forensic lab report created by a non-testifying 
technician through the testimony of another witness, even though that second witness took 
no part in the actual autopsy or preparing the subsequent report.  Compare Melendez-Diaz, 
129 S. Ct. at 2530 (―The question presented is whether those affidavits are ‗testimonial,‘ 
rendering the affiants ‗witnesses‘ subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment.‖), with Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429-31 (deciding whether the admission of 
an unredacted autopsy report, prepared by a non-testifying witness but introduced through a 
surrogate expert witness, violated defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights). 
29 See, e.g., Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846 (holding that an autopsy report was non-
testimonial and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
4
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to formulate his or her own opinion, such evidence does not violate 
the Confrontation Clause.30  This principle has been extended to other 
forensic reports such as DNA analyses as well.31 
The court referenced various indicia of reliability that the 
Court of Appeals previously set out in People v. Rawlins,32 which in-
clude: 
[T]he extent to which the entity conducting the proce-
dure is an arm of law enforcement; whether the con-
tents of the report are a contemporaneous record of 
objective facts, or reflect the exercise of fallible hu-
man judgment; the question—closely related to the 
previous two—of whether a pro-law-enforcement bias 
is likely to influence the contents of the report; and 
whether the report‘s contents are directly accusatory in 
the sense that they explicitly link the defendant to the 
crime.33 
The court in Hall recognized that the OCME is an impartial 
agency and is independent from other law enforcement agencies, in-
cluding prosecutors34; the OCME‘s mandate is ―to provide an impar-
tial determination of the cause of death.‖35  Conducting autopsies and 
creating reports under such guidelines led the court to believe no pro-
law enforcement bias existed.36  Moreover, the court‘s recognition of 
the ―factual portions of the autopsy report consisting primarily of 
 
30 See id. at 845-46 (admitting the factual portions of the autopsy report was permissible 
and did not violate defendant‘s confrontation rights). 
31 See People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931-32 (N.Y. 2009) (holding admission of a 
DNA report without producing the technician who performed the testing did not violate de-
fendant‘s rights under the confrontation clause). 
32 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). 
33 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 430; Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1030-31. 
34 See Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (―The OCME is not a law enforcement agency and is by 
law, independent of and not subject to the control of the prosecutor.‖ (quoting Freycinet, 892 
N.E.2d at 846 (internal quotations omitted)). 
35 Id. at 431 (quoting People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1995).  The court 
also pointed out that while the OCME conducts autopsies where the death is suspected to be 
criminal in nature, it also performs autopsies arising from ―accident[s], suicide, suddenly 
when in apparent health, [or] when unattended by a physician.‖  See id. at 431 (citing NEW 
YORK CITY CHARTER § 557(f)(1)). 
36 Id. at 431; see also Washington, 654 N.E.2d at 969 (―The People have no power to dic-
tate the contents or practices within OCME.  Moreover, Medical Examiners have no authori-
ty to gather evidence with an eye toward prosecuting a perpetrator.‖). 
5
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contemporaneous observations and measurements‖ satisfies the crite-
rion of contemporaneous objective facts under the above test.37 
The court held that the remaining factor, ―whether the report‘s 
contents are ‗directly accusatory‘ in the sense that they explicitly link 
the defendant to the crime,‖ also was not established.38  The court ex-
plicitly mentioned how the report only documented what happened to 
the victim.39  The shooter‘s identity, height, weight, along with the 
number of guns used, or even the number of shooters, could not be 
determined from the report.40  Thus, ―the factual portions of the au-
topsy report . . . did not directly link defendant to the crime.‖41  Using 
the criteria set forth in Rawlins, the Appellate Division‘s ruling in 
Hall was consistent with previous Court of Appeals cases in this 
area.42  Thus, under this approach, the court in Hall correctly deter-
mined that the autopsy report was non-testimonial and did in violate 
defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
IV. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
Understanding the current framework of the Confrontation 
Clause necessarily begins with a brief analysis of its origins.  In 
Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court focused repeatedly on 
―the historical background of the Clause to understand its mean-
ing.‖43 
 
37 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432; see Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845 (providing that evidence is 
testimonial where ―the contents of the report are a contemporaneous record of objective 
facts, or reflect the exercise of ‗fallible human judgment‘ ‖) (citing Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 
1030-31). 
38 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432; Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846 (citing Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 
1033, 1035). 
39 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432. 
40 Id. at 431-32. 
41 Id. at 432; Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. 
42 See Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931-32 (holding admission of a DNA report without the tes-
timony of the technician who prepared the report did not violate defendant‘s confrontation 
rights); Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846 (holding that admission of the factual portions of an 
autopsy report was non-testimonial and thus admissible without implicating the Confronta-
tion Clause). 
43  
[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was 
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.  It was these prac-
tices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh‘s; 
6
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In Crawford, the defendant stabbed a man who purportedly 
attempted to rape his wife.44  The police interviewed and recorded the 
wife‘s account of the incident, and the prosecution sought to intro-
duce this recording ―as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-
defense.‖45  The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court‘s 
admission of the recording after deeming it bore ―particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness.‖46  The Supreme Court, however, reversed 
the decision, finding the recording to be ―testimonial‖ and therefore 
in violation of defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confront his ac-
cuser.47  Under Crawford, evidence deemed ―testimonial‖ is inad-
missible unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.48 
Although the Supreme Court has ruled on several Confronta-
tion Clause cases, the Court has yet to formulate a definition of what 
 
that the Marian statutes invited; that English law‘s assertion of a right to 
confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric 
decried.  The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in 
mind. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.  Sir Walter Raleigh‘s case was discussed extensively in Crawford.  
Id. at 44-45, 50, 52-53, 62.  In seventeenth century England, government investigators rec-
orded witness statements in lieu of in-court testimony.  Id. at 43.  One of these witnesses, 
Lord Cobham, an alleged conspirator against the crown, implicated Raleigh during an inves-
tigation and examination.  Id.  Believing Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded to con-
front ―my accuser before my face.‖  Id. at 44.  The court refused to oblige, and Raleigh was 
found guilty and executed.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  The Supreme Court had Sir Walter 
Raleigh‘s case in mind when attempting to rectify past abuses and questions left by former 
Confrontation Clause precedent.  Id. at 44-45. 
44 Id. at 38. 
45 Id. at 40-41. 
46 Id. at 41.  The Washington Supreme Court relied on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, which held that testimony against a witness 
can be admitted if it bears ―adequate indicia of reliability,‖ a test which can be satisfied it the 
evidence bears ―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness‖ or falls within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66.  This standard, however, departed from the 
Framers‘ intentions because ex parte testimony could still be admitted against the accused, 
―untested by the adversary process based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.‖  Id. 
at 62. 
47 Id. at 68-69. 
48 Id. at 68.  In Crawford, the defendant‘s wife was unavailable to testify because Wash-
ington has a marital privilege which allows the testimony of one spouse only with the other 
spouse‘s consent.  Id. at 40.  Crawford‘s wife‘s statement was recorded during police inter-
rogation, and Crawford had no opportunity to cross-examine his wife at that time.  Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
7
Ince: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1000 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
constitutes testimonial.49  Under Crawford, ―testimonial‖ hearsay is 
―a specific type of out-of-court statement‖ that triggers the Confron-
tation Clause because the hearsay ―consists of ex parte testimony.‖50  
The Court pointed out that testimonial statements are ―typically [] so-
lemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of estab-
lishing or proving some fact.51  The Court added that the term ―testi-
monial . . . applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police inter-
rogations.‖52  Testimonial evidence can also consist of affidavits, de-
positions, confessions, past trials, or hearings, but the Court gave no 
indication as to whether autopsy reports fall into this category.53 
Each of the above has several key elements in common: each 
is an in-court statement, made under oath, with a high degree of for-
mality and is given to a government officer.  The Court in Crawford 
discussed how the Confrontation Clause applies to ―witnesses‖ 
against the accused, that is, those who bear testimony.54  According 
to the Court, ―[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to govern-
ment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a 
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.‖55  It follows that the 
 
49 See, e.g., Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164 (expanding the scope of the term ―emergency‖ to 
cover a threat to police officers and the public in general); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (holding that statements ―are testimonial when the circumstances ob-
jectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution‖). 
50 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 60. 
51 Id. at 51. 
52 Id. at 68. 
53    
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex 
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such 
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant 
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that decla-
rants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as af-
fidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial. 
Id. at 51-52 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
54 Id. at 51. 
55 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
8
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Court was wary of government involvement in the ―production of tes-
timonial evidence‖ because it poses the same risk of violating the 
Confrontation Clause as the investigatory practices of seventeenth 
century England.56 
Another proposition the Court in Crawford extrapolated from 
the historical record was the Framers‘ indent to prohibit ―testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was un-
available to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.‖57  This proposition is firmly rooted in Supreme 
Court precedent, dating as far back as 1895 when Mattox v. United 
States58 was decided.  In Mattox, the testimony of a then-deceased 
witness was admitted because the defendant had an adequate oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness at the first trial.59  Later cases 
have affirmed this position60 while simultaneously, and axiomatical-
ly, affirming the opposite.61 
The Court in Crawford observed that where non-testimonial 
 
56 Id. at 53.  It is apparent that the Supreme Court was troubled by the use at trial of ex 
parte statements given to government officers.  The Court in Crawford discussed at length 
that government involvement in eliciting the testimonial statement bears the ―closest kinship 
to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.‖  Id. at 68.  ―An off-hand, 
overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion un-
der hearsay rule, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation 
Clause targeted.‖  Id. at 51. 
57 Id. at 53-54. 
58 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (―The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved 
to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of 
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.  This, the law says, he shall under no 
circumstances be deprived of . . . .‖). 
59 Id. at 244. 
60 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970) (―The subsequent opportunity for 
cross-examination at trial with respect to both present and past versions of the event, is ade-
quate to make equally admissible, as far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned‖); Pointer 
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (―Under this Court‘s prior decisions, the Sixth Amend-
ment‘s guarantee of confrontation and cross-examination was unquestionably denied peti-
tioner in this case.‖). 
61 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (holding where there was no op-
portunity for cross-examination, the accomplice confessions were excluded).  Even with re-
cently decided cases, the Supreme Court has remained faithful to past precedent and the 
Framers‘ intentions: the Court in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139 (1999), excluded testi-
monial evidence because the defendant had no opportunity for cross-examination; in Bour-
jaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), statements made to an FBI informant 
were admitted even though the Court applied a more general standard that did not mandate 
prior cross-examination; in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-69, the Court allowed testimony 
given at a preliminary hearing where defendant had the opportunity to examine the witness. 
9
Ince: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1002 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
hearsay is at issue, States retain the flexibility to formulate hearsay 
laws at their discretion.62  However, if testimonial hearsay is at issue, 
the Sixth Amendment demands a showing of unavailability and a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination before admitting the state-
ments.63  The reliability of evidence is assessed not substantively by a 
judge, but procedurally though the ―crucible of cross-examination.‖64  
Besides providing that prior testimony and police interrogations con-
stitute testimonial evidence, the Court in Crawford left ―for another 
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of [the 
term].‖65 
As a helpful tool, Crawford identified non-testimonial types 
of hearsay which would not implicate confrontation concerns.66  
Crawford specifically stated that evidence covered by the majority of 
hearsay exceptions, such as business records and co-conspirators 
statements, are not testimonial by their very nature.67  Furthermore, 
Crawford emphasized the importance of the statement being made to 
a police officer or being produced by another government official.68 
Several years later, the Supreme Court addressed some of the 
ambiguities regarding ―testimonial‖ evidence in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.  In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was arrested and 
charged with trafficking and distributing cocaine.69  During trial, the 
prosecution sought to admit into evidence three certificates of analy-
sis showing the results of forensic analyses performed on a seized 
substance.70  The certificates recorded the weight of the bags of a 
 
62 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
63 Id.  After all, Raleigh was free to confront the witness reading Cobham‘s confession, 
yet his trial was a ―paradigmatic confrontation violation.‖  Id. at 52. 
64 Id. at 61 (―[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.‖). 
65 Id. at 68. 
66 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
67 Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s concurring opinion added spontaneous declarations ―and 
countless other hearsay exceptions.‖  Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
68 See id. at 51-53 (―An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not.‖); see, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-58 (1992) (holding that the child‘s 
statements to police officers were testimonial but failing to even discuss the possibility of the 
child‘s statements to her mother, babysitter, nurse and doctor as remotely testimonial). 
69 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. 
70 Id. at 2530-31.  ―The certificates were sworn before a notary public by analysts at the 
10
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substance that was confiscated and the time of arrest, and the exami-
nation resulted in indentifying the substance as cocaine.71 
The trial court admitted the certificates and the jury ultimately 
found Melendez-Diaz guilty.72  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine whether these certificates of analysis, characterized as 
affidavits, were testimonial, thereby invoking defendant‘s rights un-
der the Confrontation Clause.73  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court 
held that admitting the affidavits without the opportunity for defen-
dant to confront the analysts who prepared them violated his Sixth 
Amendment rights.74  To the Court in Melendez-Diaz, there was ―lit-
tle doubt‖ that the certificates were ―quite plainly affidavits‖ and 
therefore fell within the core class of testimonial statements described 
in Crawford.75  The certificates were the functional equivalent to 
―live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on di-
rect examination.‖76 
The Court rejected respondent‘s argument that the affirma-
tions here, being the result of neutral testing procedures, are different 
than testimony recalling historical facts ―which is prone to distortion 
or manipulation.‖77  The Court pointed out how the precise testing 
procedures used by the analysts were unknown, but noted how the 
methodology that was followed ―requires the exercise of judgment 
and presents a risk of error that might be explored on cross-
 
State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health as required un-
der Massachusetts law.‖  Id. 
71 Id. at 2530. 
72 Id. at 2531.  Melendez-Diaz appealed but the Appeals Court affirmed the admission.  
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.  Defendant appealed once again to the Supreme Judicial 
Court but was denied review.  Id. 
73 Id. at 2530. 
74 Id. at 2532. 
75 Id. 
76 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Moreover, the affidavits ―made under circumstances which would lead an objec-
tive witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later tri-
al.‖  Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52) (internal quotations omitted).  The Court as-
sumed that the analysts were cognizant of the evidentiary purpose of the affidavits because 
their purpose was reprinted on the affidavits themselves.  Id.  The affidavits were deemed 
testimonial evidence and, as such, ―[a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to 
testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, [the defen-
dant] was entitled to be confronted with the analysts at trial.‖  Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 53-54) (internal quotations omitted). 
77 Id. at 2536. 
11
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examination.‖78  The Court further explained how ―types of forensic 
evidence commonly used in criminal prosecutions,‖ including autop-
sy reports, are prone to factors that suggest inaccurate results can oc-
cur and be exposed on cross-examination.79 
A similar issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in Bull-
coming v. New Mexico.80  In Bullcoming, the defendant was arrested 
for driving while intoxicated.81  Defendant refused a breathalyzer test 
after failing a field sobriety test, so a warrant was issued to draw his 
blood to determine his blood alcohol concentration (―BAC‖).82  The 
report indicated Bullcoming had a BAC of .21, a level high enough to 
prosecute him for the more serious crime of aggravated DWI.83  The 
report also confirmed that the seal was intact when it reached the la-
boratory, the analyst‘s statements are correct, and the examiner had 
followed correct procedure.84 
At trial, the prosecution announced it would not call the ana-
lyst who had performed the tests because he had been placed on un-
paid leave, but instead would call another analyst from the same of-
fice.‖85  The defense objected, claiming admission of the report 
without the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst who tested 
Bullcoming‘s blood would violate his Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion rights.86  The trial court overruled the objection, allowing the re-
sults of the test to be admitted as business records.87  Bullcoming was 
found guilty of aggravated DWI and the New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction.88 
 
78 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (―Like expert witnesses generally, and analyst‘s lack 
of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.‖). 
79 Id. at 2536-38 (providing the example of ―[a] forensic analyst . . . feel[ing] pressure-or 
hav[ing] an incentive-to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution‖ or even 
―sometimes fac[ing] pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expedien-
cy‖); see also Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846 (―Admittedly, a report of a doctor‘s findings at 
an autopsy may reflect more exercise of judgment than the report of a DNA technician[.]‖). 
80 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
81 Id. at 2709. 
82 Id. at 2710.  Pursuant to laboratory practices, the forensic analyst conducting the BAC 
test is aware of the individual‘s identity and certifies all findings.  Id. 
83 Id. at 2711. 
84 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
85 Id. at 2711-12. 
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The New Mexico Supreme Court, citing Melendez-Diaz, ac-
knowledged that while the BAC was ―testimonial evidence,‖ its ad-
mission into evidence did not violate defendant‘s right to confront his 
accuser, despite the fact that the forensic analyst who performed the 
test was unavailable.89  The Supreme Court reversed the decision, 
holding that where ―an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, 
it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the wit-
ness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a 
prior opportunity to confront that witness.‖90 
The Court discussed how the examiner‘s report contained 
―more than a machine-generated number‖91; the analyst certified to 
―receiv[ing defendant‘s] blood sample intact with the seal unbroken, 
checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample 
number correspond[ed], and that he performed a particular test on 
Bullcoming‘s sample, adhering to a precise protocol.‖92  The Court 
stated that ―[t]hese representations, relating to past events and human 
actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for 
cross-examination.‖93  The surrogate testimony failed to convey what 
the examiner knew or observed regarding his certification, i.e., ―the 
particular test and testing process he employed.‖94  In short, the fo-
rensic examiner who tested Bullcoming‘s blood became a ―witness‖ 
for Sixth amendment purposes who should have been available for 
confrontation.95 
Although states are required to apply Supreme Court 
precedent to federal Constitutional questions, the Appellate Division 
distinguished the then-most recent federal case, Melendez-Diaz, with 
the leading Court of Appeals cases.96  The court determined that the 
 
89 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712-13. 
90 Id. at 2713. 
91 Id. at 2714. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
95 Id. at 2715-16; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the Court‘s holding means ―the . . . analyst who must testify is the person who 
signed the certificate‖). 
96 Kin Kan, 574 N.E.2d at 1045 (―All courts are, of course, bound by the United States 
Supreme Court‘s interpretations of Federal statutes and the Federal Constitution.‖).  It must 
be noted that at the time People v. Hall was decided, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts was 
the most recent case pertaining to the issue of confrontation.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico was 
13
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issues in Melendez-Diaz and Hall were distinct enough to sufficiently 
establish the inapplicability of federal precedent.97  Instead, the court 
looked to binding Court of Appeals cases which were ―directly on 
point.‖98 
In order to distinguish Melendez-Diaz from Hall, the court 
emphasized the distinctions between the procedures used and sur-
rounding circumstances that created the evidence.  First, the court in 
Hall concluded that the holding in Melendez-Diaz did not definitively 
characterize autopsy reports as ―testimonial evidence.‖99  The affida-
vits in Melendez-Diaz were ―prepared specifically for use at petition-
er‘s trial,‖ whereas autopsy reports may eventually be used for litiga-
tion purposes but are not prepared exclusively for trial.100  Moreover, 
there was no indication that Dr. Goldfedder was aware of the autopsy 
report‘s evidentiary purpose, unlike the analysts from Melendez-
Diaz.101  Therefore, the court determined that the autopsy report, un-
like the affidavits, did not fall within ―the core class of testimonial 
statements‖ expressed in Crawford.102 
Second, the Court in Melendez-Diaz did not address the issue 
presented here, where another witness testified and was cross-
examined after introducing a report the witness did not personally 
create.103  Under Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court decided the is-
 
decided approximately two months after Hall. 
97 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429-32. 
98 Id. at 430. 
99 Id. 
100 Compare Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (―[T]he analysts‘ statements here-
prepared specifically for use at petitioner‘s trial-were testimony against petitioner, and the 
analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.‖), with Hall, 923 
N.Y.S.2d at 431 (conceding that while autopsy report may be used for trial, autopsy reports 
are usually not prepared specifically for litigation purposes, contrasting with the affidavits in 
Melendez-Diaz).  The court in Hall pointed out that while the OCME conducts autopsies 
where the death is suspected to be criminal in nature, it also performs autopsies arising from 
―accident[s], suicide, suddenly when in apparent health, [or] when unattended by a physi-
cian.‖  See id. (citing NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 557(f)(1)). 
101 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
102 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431. 
103 Compare Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530 (―The question presented is whether those 
affidavits are ‗testimonial,‘ rendering the affiants ‗witnesses‘ subject to the defendant's right 
of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.‖), with Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429-31 (decid-
ing whether the admission of an unredacted autopsy report, prepared by a non-testifying wit-
ness but introduced through a surrogate expert witness, violated defendant‘s Sixth Amend-
ment rights). 
14
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sue of whether the admission of certificates of analysis, sworn under 
oath by analysts at a government laboratory, required in-court testi-
mony by those analysts, the answer to which was ―yes.‖104  In Hall, 
there was in-court testimony by a surrogate medical examiner from 
the OCME, the office where another examiner conducted the autop-
sy.105  Based on these considerations, the court found that Melendez-
Diaz was not applicable and decided to follow New York precedent 
which it felt was determinative of the issue.106 
V. THE NEW YORK APPROACH 
The New York Constitution, resembling the federal Constitu-
tion, states, in relevant part, that ―[i]n any trial in any court whatever 
the party accused shall be allowed to . . . be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him or her.‖107  Prior to Bullcoming, the New York ap-
proach towards confrontation issues is largely similar to that of the 
federal approach. 
In Hall, after its brief recitation of the federal law, the Appel-
late Division introduced the leading New York cases concerning the 
Confrontation Clause, and recognized that objective, factual data is 
admissible and does not implicate confrontation concerns.108  In 
2008, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Rawlins and its compa-
nion case, People v. Meekins.109  In Meekins, the defendant was con-
victed and charged with sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse 
in the first degree.110  At trial, the prosecutor introduced the results of 
a DNA test comparing DNA from the victim‘s rape kit to that of de-
fendant.111  The prosecutor called two expert witnesses to the stand, 
neither of whom observed or conducted the actual analysis.112  Each 
analyst testified that their opinions were derived from the results of 
 
104 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542. 
105 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429-32. 
106 Id. at 429. 
107 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
108 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 430, 432. 
109 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). 
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the DNA test and were solely their own.113  The Court of Appeals 
held that the defendant‘s right to confront the expert who actually 
performed the analysis was not violated because the report was not 
―testimonial.‖114  ―The graphical DNA test results, standing alone, 
shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the absence of an expert‘s 
opinion that the results genetically match[ed] a known sample.‖115 
However, in Rawlins, the Court of Appeals considered a fin-
gerprint comparison to be ―testimonial‖ evidence.116  At trial, the re-
sults of a fingerprint comparison between fingerprints lifted from the 
scenes of six burglarized commercial establishments and defendant‘s 
fingerprints were introduced at trial.117  Although two police officers 
conducted the test, only one appeared at trial.118  The Court of Ap-
peals held that the defendant was entitled to confront the missing of-
ficer because the fingerprint reports ―were clearly testimonial.‖119  
According to the court, the reports were testimonial because the of-
ficers ―prepared [the] reports solely for prosecutorial purposes and, 
most importantly, because they were accusatory and offered to estab-
lish [the] defendant‘s identity.‖120 
At first glance it appears that Meekins and Rawlins share simi-
lar issues with similar fact patterns yet result in different outcomes.  
The court focused on ―various indicia of testimoniality‖ to aid its de-
cisions.121  Such indicia include: 
(1) the extent to which the entity conducting the pro-
cedure is ―an ‗arm‘ of law enforcement‖; (2) whether 
the contents of the report are a contemporaneous 
record of objective facts, or reflect the exercise of ―fal-
lible human judgment‖; (3) the question—closely re-
lated to the previous two—of whether a pro-law-
enforcement bias is likely to influence the contents of 
the report; and (4) whether the report‘s contents are 
 
113 Id. at 1024-25. 
114 Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1035. 
115 Id. 
116 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
117 Id. at 1022-23. 
118 Id. at 1023. 
119 Id. at 1033. 
120 Id. 
121 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1029-31. 
16
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―directly accusatory‖ in the sense that they explicitly 
link the defendant to the crime.122 
In Meekins, the DNA report was created by analysts from a private 
laboratory, showed no indication of pro-law enforcement bias, and 
consisted of data that did not directly link the defendant to the crime 
without the assistance and testimony of an expert.123  In Rawlins, 
however, the fingerprints lifted from the crime scene matched the de-
fendant‘s, thereby directly linking him to the crime and invoking his 
right to confrontation.124  The Court of Appeals applied these factors 
once again in People v. Freycinet.125 
In Freycinet, the trial court admitted a redacted autopsy report 
which excluded the ―opinions as to the cause and manner of the vic-
tim‘s death.‖126  The report was redacted so another examiner from 
the same office could testify rather than the examiner that performed 
the autopsy.127  ―[G]iving opinions based on the facts in . . . the re-
port,‖ this examiner testified that the cause of death was bleeding 
from stab wounds and that the attacker was likely right-handed.128  
But this testimony, however, could not directly link the defendant to 
the crime.  Defendant appealed his conviction of second-degree man-
slaughter, to which both the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals 
affirmed.129 
The Court of Appeals held that the unredacted portions of the 
autopsy report, i.e., the factual portions, were ―clearly not testimoni-
al.‖130  The court further held that the autopsy report constituted a 
business record, so its admission provided no basis for a Confronta-
tion Clause violation.131  Recalling Meekins, the court in Freycinet 
emphasized how an agency independent of law enforcement per-
formed the autopsy and the factual portions did not directly link the 
 
122 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845-46 (quoting Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1030-31 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted)). 
123 Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034-35. 
124 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
125 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008). 
126 Id. at 844. 
127 Id. at 844-45. 
128 Id. at 845. 
129 Id. 
130 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. 
131 Id. at 845. 
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defendant to the crime.132 
The Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in People 
v. Brown133 when it had to determine whether a DNA report, intro-
duced through the testimony of a medical technician from a different 
forensic laboratory, violated defendant‘s confrontation rights.134  The 
People attempted to introduce the DNA report as a business record, to 
which the defense objected claiming the report was testimonial, trig-
gering defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause.135  The 
prosecution responded by stating the report ―contained merely raw 
data‖ and was therefore non-testimonial.136 
The court ultimately held that the report was non-testimonial 
and therefore did not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation.137  
The court noted that it was the testifying witness, relying on the fac-
tual portions of the report, and not the ―machine-generated graphs, 
charts, and numerical data‖ of the DNA report, that ―made the critical 
determination linking [the] defendant to [the] crime.‖138 
Most recently, the First Department addressed another Con-
frontation Clause issue in an alternative holding in People v. Encar-
nacion.139  Dr. Coye, a medical examiner from the OCME, was called 
by the prosecution to testify at trial.140  Her testimony revealed that 
she had personally conducted DNA testing on various items and had 
positively matched defendant‘s DNA to those items.141  However, Dr. 
Coye also testified as to the results of DNA testing on a pair of jeans 
which she did not personally test, but that test positively matched de-
 
132 Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034-35. 
133 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009). 
134 Id. at 928. 
135 Id. at 929. 
136 Id. at 929-30.  The prosecution cited People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1995) 
and People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501 (N.Y. 1986), which provided ―that a business record 
can be introduced by a person who is not a custodian of records, provided that the other cri-
teria for the business record exception are established.‖  Id. at 930. 
137 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 928. 
138 Id. at 931. 
139 926 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011).  The court declined to review the con-
frontation issue in the interest of justice because defendant failed to preserve this issue for 
review.  Id. at 454-55.  Nonetheless, the court discussed the issue as an alternative holding.  
Id. 
140 Id. at 456. 
141 Id. 
18
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fendant‘s DNA as well.142 
The court held in an alternative decision that the admission in-
to evidence of a forensic analyst‘s testimony concerning the results of 
a DNA test linking defendant to the crime, even though the analyst 
did not perform the test personally, did not violate defendant‘s Sixth 
Amendment rights.143  The court discussed Brown, Rawlins, and 
People v. Thompson144 in general terms, noting how the reports in 
each case were ―not accusatory and merely contain[ed] non-
identifying raw data in the form of a DNA profile and thus, standing 
alone, and in the absence of expert opinion linking the results to the 
defendant, shed no light on the guilt of the accused.‖145  The court 
followed these three cases, referring to how the reports evincing the 
findings of DNA testing, when testified to as admitted evidence, 
―[did] not invoke the Confrontation Clause and thus [could] be used 
against a defendant without production of the analyst who performed 
the DNA testing.‖146 
VI. WAS THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS CORRECT TO 
RENDER MELENDEZ-DIAZ INAPPLICABLE? 
Coincidentally, both Bullcoming and Encarnacion were de-
cided on the same date, though appear to rule differently despite a 
similar fact pattern.  Although the federal and New York State Con-
frontation Clauses contain similar language, the two approaches seem 
to conflict in some respects. 
One could argue that the Appellate Division committed clear 
error by holding Melendez-Diaz inapplicable.  One of the reasons for 
dispensing with Melendez-Diaz, the Appellate Division claimed, was 
the fact that the Supreme Court‘s decision failed to explicitly mention 
 
142 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
143 Id. 
144 895 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2010) (holding the admission of the DNA 
reports did not violate defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights and the state was not required to 
present testimony of analysts who actually conducted the tests). 
145 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (citing Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931; Meekins, 884 
N.E.2d at 1034-35; Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149).  
146 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456.  By comparing this DNA evidence to the evidence 
from Brown, Rawlins, and Thompson, the court found it to be the ―same kind [of evidence] 
that our courts have found do not violate the Confrontation Clause, namely DNA testing per-
formed by the non-testifying analyst yielding non-accusatory raw data.‖  Id. at 456. 
19
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autopsy reports as testimonial.147  However, the failure of the Su-
preme Court in Melendez-Diaz to specifically hold an autopsy report 
testimonial is not dispositive of a statement‘s testimoniality. 
Next, the Appellate Division emphasized how the certifica-
tions in Melendez-Diaz were ―prepared specifically for trial‖ and the 
analysts were unquestionably aware of the affidavits‘ evidentiary 
purpose,‖ contrasting with the situation in Hall.148  This demonstrates 
that, by failing to adhere to these factors, the court in Hall departed 
from aspects of the federal approach.149  As the Court in Bullcoming 
interpreted it, certifications ―prepared in connection with a criminal 
investigation or prosecution . . . [are] ‗testimonial,‘ and therefore 
within the compass of the Confrontation Clause.‖150  In the end, the 
autopsy report in Hall, just like the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz, was 
used by the People in connection with their criminal prosecution 
against Hall, suggesting that the report could be construed as testi-
monial. 
In addition, Crawford makes clear that statements ―made un-
der circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later tri-
al‖ falls within the ―core class of testimonial statements.‖151  An au-
topsy report of a victim who sustained two gunshot wounds should 
lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the report would be 
used in a criminal proceeding.  Furthermore, the report constituted 
―[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of estab-
 
147 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 430.  However, this is, at the very least, not inconsistent with 
Crawford and its progeny because those cases provide more of a description of ―testimonial‖ 
rather than an all-encompassing definition.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (―We leave for 
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‗testimonial.‘ ‖).  Moreo-
ver, the Crawford decision makes no mention of limiting a statement‘s testimoniality to spe-
cific genres of evidentiary sources.  It is only by mere coincidence that the majority of cases 
previously discussed deal with the admissibility of ―DNA‖ or other ―forensic‖ evidence. 
148 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, 2540. 
149 See Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (pointing out that while the OCME conducts autopsies 
where the death is suspected to be criminal in nature, it also performs autopsies arising from 
―accident[s], suicide, suddenly when in apparent health, [or] when unattended by a physi-
cian‖ (citing NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 557(f)(1))). 
150 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713-14; see Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding that a testi-
monial statement is one having a ―primary purpose‖ of ―establish[ing] or prov[ing] past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution‖). 
151 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added); see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 
(holding forensic analyses available for trial are considered ―testimonial statements‖ and the 
analyst becomes a ―witness‖ for Sixth Amendment purposes). 
20
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lishing or proving some fact.‖152  The autopsy report was used at 
Hall‘s trial to prove a past fact: the cause of the victim‘s death.153 
Unlike the Appellate Division in Hall, the Court in Melendez-
Diaz clearly rejected the argument that there is a difference between 
testimony reciting past facts, and testimony which is the ―result of 
neutral, scientific testing.‖154  The Supreme Court held in Melendez-
Diaz that the defendant was entitled to confront the analysts who pre-
pared the reports, noting that ―neutral and scientific testing‖ is not 
always as ―neutral or reliable as respondent suggests.‖155 
Despite the Appellate Court recognizing the concession of the 
court in Freycinet that autopsies may contain aspects of judgment, 
both courts nonetheless held the autopsy reports to be non-
testimonial.  This conflicts with Melendez-Diaz, where the Supreme 
Court‘s ruling would mandate the use of confrontation to expose any 
deficienc[ies] in judgment.156  For this reason, and those given above, 
it is arguable that the Appellate Court erred in Hall by rendering Me-
lendez-Diaz inapplicable, and that the autopsy report was in fact tes-
timonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, entitling Hall to confront 
Dr. Lacy. 
 
152 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
153 Hall, 923 U.S. at 431-32. 
154 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.  This, the Court explained, would only open an in-
vitation to return to the standard prescribed by Ohio v. Roberts where the admissibility of 
evidence is measured by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, circumventing the 
Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
155 Id.  The Court went on to discuss how outside pressures can sometimes force forensic 
scientists to ―sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency,‖ which would 
alter the outcomes of such neutral and scientific tests.  See id. (―A forensic analyst respond-
ing to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure – or have an incentive – to 
alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.‖).  ―Confrontation is one means 
of assuring accurate forensic analysis,‖ and is also a way to expose fraudulent or incompe-
tent analysts as well.  Id. at 2537.  Any presence of fabrication, any lack of proper training, 
or any deficiency in judgment may be revealed during cross-examination.  Id.  The Bullcom-
ing decision reinforces the idea that ―neutral and scientific testing‖ does not produce raw, 
objective data.  Instead, according to the Supreme Court, various aspects of the testing may 
have adverse impacts on the results of the tests and can be revealed through confrontation.  
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714-15. 
156 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 
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VII. HAS THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION 
OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE RUN AFOUL OF THE 
CONSTITUTION? 
If the Hall decision appears before the Court of Appeals, the 
court will have the opportunity to review whether or not the Appel-
late Division erroneously applied New York precedent instead of Me-
lendez-Diaz.  Whereas the court in Hall distinguished between the is-
sue before it and the issue before the Supreme Court in Melendez-
Diaz, Bullcoming displays a parallel situation to Hall.157  Bullcom-
ing’s holding brings into question whether or not the Court of Ap-
peals‘ interpretation of the federal Constitution‘s Confrontation 
Clause has been accurate over the decades.  While it is true the Ap-
pellate Division may have correctly analyzed the testimonial nature 
of the autopsy report in Hall under the Rawlins criteria, this approach 
may be erroneous in itself. 
The federal and New York approaches diverge where it is 
evident the analysts know their finding could be used at trial.158  The 
Court in Melendez-Diaz discussed how preparing a report to be used 
in the aid of a police investigation or criminal proceeding is a key 
factor for determining testimoniality,159 whereas in Meekins the re-
ports were held to be non-testimonial even though the analysts knew 
their findings could be used at a later trial.160  Along this same line, 
another distinguishing factor is the fact that Dr. Lacy may never have 
known Ralph Hall‘s name, whereas the analysts in both Melendez-
 
157 A forensic laboratory report created by a non-testifying witness but admitted through 
the testimony of an analyst who did not perform or observe the examination violates a de-
fendant‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause.  Compare Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 
2530 (―The question presented is whether those affidavits are ―testimonial,‖ rendering the 
affiants ―witnesses‖ subject to the defendant‘s right of confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment‖), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710 (―The question presented is whether the 
Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report con-
taining a testimonial certification . . . through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did 
not sign[,] perform or observe the test reported in the certification.‖), and Hall, 923 
N.Y.S.2d at 429 (whether the admission of an unredacted autopsy report, prepared by a non-
testifying witness but introduced through a surrogate expert witness, violated defendant‘s 
Sixth Amendment rights). 
158 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532; Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034. 
159 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (holding fo-
rensic reports available for use at trial are ―testimonial statements‖ and certifying analyst is a 
―witness‖ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)). 
160 Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034. 
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Diaz and Bullcoming were aware of the individual‘s identity.161  This 
information would be relevant because it would establish a connec-
tion between the autopsy report and a criminal prosecution.162  None-
theless, when the Court in Bullcoming discussed the ―material‖ de-
tails of the case, the analyst‘s knowledge of defendant‘s name was 
left unmentioned.163 
An additional difference that seemed relevant to the court‘s 
decision in Hall was that the autopsy report was unsworn and hence 
could not ―fairly be viewed as testimonial material.‖164  However, 
under Crawford, ―the absence of [an] oath [is] not dispositive‖ in de-
termining the testimonial nature of a statement.165  Just as the autopsy 
report in Hall was unsworn, so too was the BAC report in Bullcom-
ing.166  While the formalities of the report in Bullcoming were ―more 
than adequate to qualify [the analyst‘s] assertions as testimonial,‖167 
the autopsy report in Hall somehow failed to satisfy the requisite 
formalities to qualify as testimonial.168 
The most significant difference, however, concerns the ad-
mission of objective data.  In Bullcoming and Hall, the analysts pre-
pared a report in order to prove some past fact: the BAC of defendant 
in Bullcoming and the cause of death of the victim in Hall.169  Signif-
icant portions of the results of the BAC test, if not all, were generated 
 
161 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
162 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
163 See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717-18. 
164 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (internal quotations omitted).  The Appellate Division used 
this as another factor distinguishing the holding in Melendez-Diaz in determining its inappli-
cability.  See id. (―Thus, any holding in Melendez–Diaz, at least insofar as scientific forensic 
reports are concerned, is arguably limited to the ‗formalized testimonial materials‘ to which 
Justice Thomas referred.  Here, the autopsy report, which was unsworn, cannot fairly be 
viewed as ‗formalized testimonial material[ ].‘ ‖ (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 
(Thomas, J., concurring))). 
165 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; see Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (―Indeed, in Crawford, 
this Court rejected as untenable any construction of the Confrontation Clause that would 
render inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while leaving admission of formal, but 
unsworn statements ‗perfectly OK.‘ ‖ (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53, n.3)); see also 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (noting that informality ―does not necessarily indicate . . . lack of 
testimonial intent‖). 
166 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717; Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431. 
167 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
168 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429, 431. 
169 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710; Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429. 
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by a gas chromatograph machine.170  Despite using instruments that 
generate objective data, the human element behind the final report is 
relevant to the criminal proceeding, and the defendant was entitled to 
question the report‘s reliability.171  In other words, the apparently ob-
jective data did not completely remove elements of subjectivity con-
cerning methodology and competency when conducting these foren-
sic analyses; the past events and human aspects of the testing, apart 
from the actual results, could be exposed through cross-
examination.172  This is consistent with the holding in Melendez-Diaz 
where the Court discussed how facts and otherwise neutral data can 
be susceptible to human judgment, incompetency and fraudulent be-
havior.173 
In Freycinet, however, the Court of Appeals found the factual 
portions of the autopsy report to be ―clearly not testimonial‖ and 
therefore admissible, despite conceding that a ―doctor‘s findings at an 
autopsy may reflect [an] exercise of judgment.‖174  Likewise, in 
Brown, the Court of Appeals observed how the machine-generated 
data did not link the defendant to the crime and was therefore consi-
dered non-testimonial.175  The Court of Appeals in Rawlins’ compa-
nion case, People v. Meekins, also held that the DNA comparison re-
port was non-testimonial.176 
In light of Bullcoming’s narrow holding concerning forensic 
 
170 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710-11.  Even though the New Mexico Supreme Court de-
scribed the analyst as a ―mere scrivener,‖ recording only data the machine produced, the Su-
preme Court noted there is more to just a ―raw, machine-generated‖ report.  Id. at 2715.  See 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (holding if an out-of-court statement seeks to prove a past 
fact essential to the case the Confrontation Clause is triggered); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at  
822 (holding that a statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is to ―establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution‖). 
171 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715-16. 
172 Id. at 2714.  With the analyst that performed the test on the stand, a defense attorney 
would have the opportunity to ask questions that reveal any incompetence or deceit.  See id. 
at 2715 (―With Caylor on the stand, Bullcoming‘s counsel could have asked questions de-
signed to reveal whether incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty . . . .‖). 
173 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (―Like expert witnesses generally, an analyst‘s 
lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.‖); 
see also Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 n.8 (noting how the testifying witness ―acknowl-
edged that you don‘t know unless you actually observe the analysis that someone else con-
ducts, whether they followed th[e] protocol in every instance‖). 
174 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. 
175 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931. 
176 Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034-35. 
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laboratory reports, the decision in Hall may turn out to run afoul of 
the United States Constitution.  The crux of the analysis is that the is-
sues in Bullcoming and Hall are very nearly a mirror image of one 
another, yet the holdings come out opposite each other.177  The feder-
al approach under Bullcoming, unlike the New York approach, re-
quires that the creators of scientific forensic reports be available to 
testify as to their findings, regardless of whether the prosecution 
seeks only to admit factual portions or machine-generated data.178  If 
these witnesses are unavailable to testify, the Constitution demands a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination, or else such evidence vi-
olates a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.179 
On the contrary, the New York Court of Appeals has conti-
nuously held that the admission of the factual portions of such reports 
does not violate the defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause, even where the originator is unavailable to testify.180  The 
factual portions of the autopsy report that Dr. Goldfedder testified to 
did not shed light on the methods used by Dr. Lacy when performing 
the autopsy.181  Like the defendant in Bullcoming, Hall should have 
had the right to confront Dr. Lacy to explore his competence and the 
testing processes he employed. 
Even after reanalyzing the application of Melendez-Diaz to 
Hall, and in light of Bullcoming, the answer of whether the Appellate 
Court‘s decision is erroneous is still not clear.  The Court of Appeals, 
if given the opportunity to review Hall, can clarify the precedential 
value of Rawlins and its progeny, or overrule the Appellate Court‘s 
decision to comply with the federal Constitution.  However, the Su-
 
177 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (holding that admitting objective, factual data from a 
forensic laboratory test through the testimony of a surrogate expert violates the Confronta-
tion Clause).  But see Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431-32 (holding that admitting the factual por-
tions of an autopsy report through the testimony of a surrogate expert witness does not vi-
olate the Confrontation Clause). 
178 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
179 Id. at 2716-17. 
180 See Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931-32 (holding admission of a DNA report without the tes-
timony of the technician who prepared the report did not violate defendant‘s confrontation 
rights); Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846 (holding that admission of the factual portions of an 
autopsy report was non-testimonial and thus admissible without implicating the Confronta-
tion Clause); Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034-35 (holding that the DNA comparison report, 
containing non-identifying graphical information, was not testimonial and therefore its ad-
mission did not violate defendant's rights under the confrontation clause). 
181 Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432. 
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preme Court may get its chance to clarify its position sooner in Wil-
liams v. Illinois,182 a case which can have ramifications for several 
New York Court of Appeals cases.  The issue presented in the peti-
tion for certiorari is: ―Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an 
expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed 
by non-testifying analysts, where the defendant has no opportunity to 
confront the actual analysts, violates the Confrontation Clause.‖183 
This issue is arguably identical to that in Bullcoming and 
Hall.  The Williams decision has the ability to either call into ques-
tion or affirm New York‘s approach to the Constitution‘s meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause.184  As foretold by Justice Kennedy‘s dis-
sent in Bullcoming, there are no definite projections as to where the 







182 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).  In Williams, defen-
dant was convicted, inter alia, of sexual assault after defendant‘s DNA profile matched the 
DNA profile from the victim‘s rape kit.  Id. at 269, 271.  The DNA report was introduced at 
trial by a forensic analyst who had not conducted the test herself.  Id. at 271-72.  The Illinois 
Supreme Court held that admitting the test results did not implicate defendant‘s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accuser.  Id. at 282. 
183 Williams v. Illinois, Petition for Writ of Cert, i. 
184 Williams concerns a DNA report, as did Encarnacion, Brown and Meekins.  In addi-
tion, the issue in Williams, where the court permitted the introduction of forensic evidence 
without testimony from the analyst who performed the tests, is similar to that in Freycinet 
and Brown. 
185  
This Court‘s prior decisions leave trial judges to ―guess what future rules 
this Court will distill from the sparse constitutional text,‖ or to struggle 
to apply an ―amorphous, if not entirely subjective,‖ ―highly context-
dependent inquiry‖ involving ―open-ended balancing.‖  The persistent 
ambiguities in the Court‘s approach are symptomatic of a rule not ame-
nable to sensible applications. 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725-26 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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